This paper explores the e¤ects of labor and product market reforms in a New Keynesian, small open economy model with labor market frictions and endogenous producer entry. We show that it takes time for reforms to pay o¤, typically at least a couple of years. This is partly because the bene…ts materialize through …rm entry and increased hiring, both of which are gradual processes, while any reform-driven layo¤s are immediate. All reforms we consider stimulate GDP already in the short run, but some of them-such as reductions in employment protection-increase unemployment temporarily. Implementing a broad package of labor and product market reforms minimizes transition costs. Importantly, reforms do not have noticeable de ‡ationary e¤ects, suggesting that the inability of monetary policy to deliver large interest rate cuts in their aftermath-either because of the zero bound on policy rates or because of membership in a monetary union-may not be a relevant obstacle to reform. Alternative simple monetary policy rules do not have a large e¤ect on transition costs. JEL Codes: E24, E32, E52, F41, J64.
Introduction
Calls for market reforms to improve economic performance have become a mantra in policy discussions. One only needs to read the transcripts of ECB President Mario Draghi's speeches and press conferences over the last three years or the statements of other European policymakers to substantiate the point. Structural reforms appear to have become a crucial ingredient of the policy menu at a time when the conventional tools of demand-side macroeconomic policy are constrained and unconventional tools are being deployed without certainty of their e¤ectiveness. In the academic literature, a large body of economic theory points to long-term gains from reforms designed to increase the ‡exibility of labor and product markets. However, most of this literature provides insights into the long-term impact of such structural reforms from a static perspective. 1 Much less consensus exists on the short-run e¤ects and transition dynamics triggered by changes in product and labor market regulation, leaving the issue of whether market reforms imply trading short-term pain for long-term gains largely unsettled. Yet this issue bears major implications for the political feasibility of reforms, as transition costs may be viewed by policymakers called upon to implement reforms as a daunting obstacle to action.
The nature of the short-and medium-term impact of reforms also matters for their desirability in the context in which they are advocated now-where traditional, demand-side macroeconomic policy cannot be used to smooth potential short-run costs and help front-load bene…cial long-run e¤ects. This issue is especially relevant at the current juncture, with monetary policies constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates and/or monetary union membership, and …scal policies tied by austerity requirements. With respect to monetary policy, a debate has emerged recently in the literature as to whether a binding ZLB could exacerbate potential short-run costs of reforms. According to this argument, in a ZLB situation, reform-driven shocks to current output supply may lower prices, raise the real interest rate, and thereby depress rather than stimulate the economy (a situation labelled the "paradox of toil" in Eggertsson, 2010) . Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Ra¤o (2014) build on this argument in their analysis of structural reforms and monetary policy in Europe. On the other hand, market reforms may generate a positive wealth e¤ect on consumption by increasing future income levels, and thereby stimulate current aggregate demand and output.
When the ZLB is binding, this wealth e¤ect should typically be larger as it is not dampened by the increase in interest rates that would occur in "normal times" (Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón- 1 For instance, this is the approach in an in ‡uential paper by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). markets are characterized by search-and-matching frictions, with endogenous job creation and destruction, as in Diamond (1982a,b) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) . Nominal rigidity implies that the monetary policy regime matters for the shortterm consequences of market reforms. Deregulation of the product market reduces sunk producer entry costs (by cutting "red tape"). Deregulation of labor markets lowers unemployment bene…ts and employment protection (worker bargaining power and …ring costs). We focus on a small open economy scenario to capture the situation of weak Euro Area countries for which such market reforms have been advocated to improve economic performance. In so doing, we contribute to the debate on non-conventional policy instruments to boost economies out of persistent weakness. 3 A contribution of this paper relative to the existing literature is to consider a wider menu of possible market reforms.
We …nd that product market and, to a lesser extent, labor market reforms have positive e¤ects on GDP and consumption, and also reduce unemployment, in the long run. 4 However, it takes time for reforms to pay o¤ in terms of aggregate consumption and employment, typically at least a couple of years, consistent with studies referred to above. This is partly because the bene…ts of reforms materialize through …rm entry or increased hiring, both of which are gradual processes, while any reform-driven layo¤s are immediate. The gains from product market reforms accrue more slowly than those from labor market reforms, although they are also typically larger.
Some reforms can entail transition costs: While all reforms are found to stimulate GDP already in the short run, some of them temporarily increase unemployment-typically for one to two years.
In particular, employment protection reform initially increases layo¤s more than it creates jobs, and product market reform can also temporarily lead to net job destruction as incumbent …rms downsize, and reallocation of laid-o¤ workers takes time. By contrast, cuts in unemployment bene…ts or strengthening of activation policies (improvement of matching e¢ ciency in the labor market) quickly reduce unemployment as they stimulate hiring without a¤ecting …ring. 3 Andrés, Arce, and Thomas (2014) explore the role of structural reforms as an instrument to push economies out of recession in the presence of debt deleveraging. Following Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Ra¤o (2014) , they model reforms as exogenous reductions in price and wage markups. Cacciatore, Fiori, and Ghironi (2013) use a model with product and labor market dynamics to study the consequences of market reforms for optimal monetary policy in a two-country monetary union, and Cacciatore, Fiori, and Ghironi (2015) focus on how reforms in the Euro Area a¤ect U.S.-Europe interdependence. Langot, Patureau, and Sopraseuth (2014) focus on the …scal side of the structural reform debate-the reduction of tax-induced ine¢ ciency wedges-in a model with labor, but not product, market dynamics. 4 These …ndings are qualitatively in line with existing DSGE model-based and empirical literature, with the partial exception of employment protection reform, which has been found to have ambiguous e¤ects on unemployment in other theoretical and empirical studies. In our model and calibration, employment protection reform (a reduction of …ring costs and the bargaining power of individual workers) reduces unemployment.
The short-term e¤ects of structural reform in one area depend in part on existing policy and institutional settings in other areas. For instance, short-term dynamics in the aftermath of product market reform are smoother if the labor market is more ‡exible. However, the long-term gains from product market reform are then smaller, i.e., there is long-run substitutability (rather than complementarity) between product and labor market reforms.
Policy can exploit the interdependence in the consequences of institutional settings across markets to minimize the transition costs of reforms. This is accomplished by implementing broad packages of labor and product market reforms. Speci…cally, reducing entry barriers in product markets in parallel to labor market reforms reverses the real wage losses and implied unfavorable demand e¤ects that would result from the latter alone. 5 Importantly, structural reforms are not found to have noticeable de ‡ationary e¤ects. This result contrasts with the implications of exogenous price and wage markup cuts in Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Ra¤o (2014) and other studies that use the same approach to modeling reforms. It suggests that inability of monetary policy to deliver interest rate cuts in the aftermath of reformseither because of the ZLB or because the country belongs to a monetary union-should not be an obstacle to reform implementation. 6 Alternative simple, empirically relevant monetary policy rules do not imply large changes in transition costs. This is because the dynamic adjustment to reform is primarily driven by …rm and consumer expectations of long-run e¤ects of reforms that do not depend on monetary policy. The welfare costs of transition dynamics are only marginally smaller if the reforming country has a ‡oating exchange rate than belonging to a monetary union.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the calibration and results of our baseline exercise. Section 4 analyzes the consequences of reform packages. Section 5 focuses on the role of monetary policy. Section 6 concludes.
The Model Household Preferences
We consider a small open economy populated by a unit mass of in…nitely lived, atomistic households.
Each household is thought of as a large extended family with a continuum of members on the 5 This result is consistent with the view that deregulating product markets …rst (or in conjunction to labor) can both mitigate the negative short-term impact of labor market reforms and facilitate their implementation-a point made by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , though in a static framework. 6 Cacciatore, Fiori, and Ghironi (2013 …nd that the optimal monetary policy response to market reform is expansionary, but this is driven by an incentive to front-load long-run gains rather than a response to sizable de ‡ationary e¤ects in the short run. unit interval. In equilibrium some members will be employed while others will be unemployed.
Unemployed workers receive a …xed amount w u > 0 of household production units. As customary in the literature, family members perfectly insure each other against variation in labor income due to employment status, so that there is no ex-post heterogeneity across individuals (see Andolfatto, 1996, and Merz, 1995) . We assume habit persistence in consumption utility as this improves the quantitative performance of the model by slowing down the response of consumption to shocks.
The representative household maximizes expected intertemporal utility, E t P 1 s=t s t u(C H s ; C H s 1 ) , where the discount factor and habit parameter h both lie between 0 and 1, and the period util-
where L t is the number of employed workers, and C t is an Armington basket of domestic and imported consumption sub-bundles de…ned by:
In this expression (1 ) capture the degree of home bias in preferences and is the elasticity of substitution across domestic and foreign output bundles. Note that w u is de…ned in the same units as C t .
Production
Household members are employed by perfectly competitive …rms to produce a non tradable intermediate input that is sold to monopolistically competitive wholesale producers. These use the intermediate input to produce di¤erentiated consumption goods. Importantly, the number of producers in the wholesale sector is endogenous, and it varies in response to aggregate shocks. In the …nal stage of production, perfectly competitive retailers combine bundles of domestic di¤erentiated goods and imported varieties to produce a …nal homogeneous good, Y t .
Retailers
Firms in the retail sector are perfectly competitive and demand both domestic (Y d;t ) and imported goods (Y x;t ) to produce Y t :
The corresponding aggregate price index is given by
The sub-baskets Y d;t and Y x;t are aggregates of di¤erentiated goods produced by Home and Foreign wholesale producers:
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between individual goods, and is the set of all wholesale di¤erentiated goods to which retailers (and, in turn, consumers) would like to have access to. In each period t, only subsets t and t of are actually produced domestically and abroad, respectively. This implies price sub-indexes:
where p d;t (!) is the price of a di¤erentiated good produced and sold domestically and p x;t (!) is the price of an imported good, both expressed in units of home currency. 7 7 Currency only serves as a unit of account in our model, and we work in a cashless environment as in Woodford (2003) .
Incumbent Wholesalers
Each incumbent wholesale …rm serves both domestic and foreign retailers. Exporting is costly due to the presence of iceberg trade costs t : Delivering one unit of good to the export market requires shipping t > 1 units. Wholesale producer ! uses the intermediate input to produce with the linear technology y t (!) = y I t (!), where y I t (!) is the amount of intermediate input used by producer !. Domestic demand for home good ! is given by:
We assume that the share of the small economy's goods consumed in the rest of the world is positive but negligible from the rest of the world's perspective. Export demand for the same domestic producer ! is:
where p x;t (!) is the price of the exported good in the foreign currency, and P x;t and P t are de…ned analogously to (1) and (2) . Notice that (4) implies that the domestic producer faces a downward sloping demand for its own product in the international market. Hence, in the aggregate, the small open economy maintains the ability to a¤ect its terms of trade.
De…ne the real prices d;t (!) p d;t (!)=P t and x;t (!) p x;t (!)=P t : The expressions (3) and (4) can be rearranged as:
We assume producer currency pricing. The law of one price (adjusted for the presence of iceberg trade costs) requires p x;t (!) = t " t p d;t (!), where " t is the nominal exchange rate. Following Rotemberg (1982) , wholesale good prices are sticky in the form of a quadratic price adjustment cost t (!) de…ned as:
where 0 (prices are ‡exible if = 0), t (!) (p d;t (!) =p d;t 1 (!)) 1, and Q t " t P t =P t is the real exchange rate. 8 Using the law of one price, we have:
where
Total revenue for producer ! is given by:
Total cost is given by:
where ' t is the price of the intermediate input (in unit of consumption). Hence, total pro…ts (which will be distributed to households as dividends) are:
Firm ! maximizes the present discounted value of the stream of current and future pro…ts
;where t;s s t u C H;s =u C H;t is the stochastic discount factor, u C H;t is the marginal utility of household consumption, and (1 ) is the probability of …rm survival until the next period (see below). 9 Dropping the product identi…er ! since home wholesalers are symmetric in equilibrium, the …rst-order condition with respect to d;t yields the optimal pricing equation d;t = t ' t , where t is a time-varying markup given by:
8 Notice that is denominated in units of consumption and the total price adjustment cost is proportional to the …rm's total revenue. The latter assumption captures the idea that larger …rms need to purchase larger amounts of materials when implementing price changes as standard in the literature that builds on Rotemberg's (1982) model of price rigidity. 9 We are implicitly assuming that all …rms are fully owned domestically.
The markup reduces to the familiar constant = = ( 1) if prices are ‡exible. 10 The export price is determined by x;t = t t ' t =Q t . Prices of individual foreign wholesale goods are determined in a similar manner by d;t = t ' t and x;t = t Q t t ' t .
The Number of Firms and Producer Entry
Building on Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012), the number of …rms operating in the wholesale sector at home and abroad is endogenous and varies in response to shocks. 11 Denote with N t the mass of domestic wholesale producers on the market in period t (the mass of the set t ). As implicit in the speci…cation of costs above, there are no …xed costs of production. Therefore, all the …rms that enter the economy (a mass N E;t in period t) produce in every post-entry period unless they are hit by an exogenous exit shock which occurs with probability 2 (0; 1) at the end of every period. 12 Prior to entry, …rms face a sunk entry cost f E;t in units of intermediate input. This is interpreted as a combination of technological requirements for business creation, f T;t , and regulatory barriers to entry, f r . Both components of entry costs are exogenous and potentially subject to shocks (for simplicity, there is no time index on f r because we will consider only permanent changes in this component). Prospective entrants are forward looking and anticipate their future pro…ts d s (!) in any period s > t as well as the exogenous probability of incurring the exit-inducing shock:
As in Bilbiie et al. (2012), we assume that entrants at time t will start producing only from t + 1. 13 Prospective entrants compute their expected post-entry value e t (!), given by the presented discounted value of the expected stream of per-period pro…ts d s (!) that they will generate from period t + 1 on:
Entry occurs until this …rm value is equalized to the entry cost, leading to the free entry condition e t (!) = ' t f E;t . 14 Note that e t (!) = e t is also the value of incumbent …rms in period t. Given the time-to-build assumption, the law of motion for the number of wholesale producers is given by
The number of producing …rms represents the stock of capital of the economy. It behaves much like physical capital in standard real business cycle models and has an endogenously ‡uctuating price given by (5).
Intermediate Sector
Perfectly-competitive …rms in this sector produce a non-traded intermediate input using labor.
The labor market is characterized by search-and-matching frictions as in Diamond (1982a,b) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . Each …rm employs a continuum of workers. The stock of labor varies because of endogenous variation in hiring (job creation) and …ring (job destruction). To hire new workers …rms must post vacancies, incurring a …xed cost denominated in units of …nal output Y t . The probability of …nding a worker depends on a constant-returns-to-scale matching technology that converts aggregate unemployed workers U t and aggregate vacancies V t into aggregate matches
Labor market tightness is de…ned as # t V t =U t . Each …rm meets unemployed workers at a rate
As in Krause and Lubik (2007) , we assume that newly created matches become productive only in the next period. For an individual …rm, the in ‡ow of new hires in t + 1 is therefore q t v t ; where v t is the number of posted vacancies.
Firms and workers can separate for exogenous and endogenous reasons. When the …rm …nds a match to be no longer pro…table, it can dismiss the worker but, to do so, it has to incur a …ring cost F denominated in units of …nal output Y t . This cost is constant and proportional to the steady-state (aggregate) real wage w: F = F w, where F is a positive parameter, and we denote steady-state levels of variables by dropping the time index. 15 Production is subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Speci…cally, each …lled job produces Z t z jt units of output, where j indexes a particular job. Aggregate productivity Z t is common to all …rms and follows an AR(1) process in logs, while the speci…c job's productivity z jt is idiosyncratic. Job-speci…c productivity is an i:i:d: draw from a time invariant distribution with cumulative distribution function G(z), positive support, and density g(z). 16 For a generic intermediate input producer, total output y I t is determined by the measure l t of jobs, aggregate productivity Z t , and the average of idiosyncratic job-speci…c shocks, z t :
where z F t is the (endogenous) critical threshold below which …rms destroy non pro…table jobs with productivity z jt < z F t . Denote with S the fraction of jobs that are exogenously separated at the beginning of each period. Total separation is then given by t S + F t , where
is the fraction of jobs that are endogenously destroyed. It follows that the law of motion of employment at the representative intermediate sector …rm is given by:
Intermediate input producers choose vacancies (v t ), employment (l t ), and the threshold productivity for …ring (z F t ) to maximize the expected present discounted value of current and future pro…ts
subject to (7) . The …rst term in the period pro…t function is the real value of the intermediate producer's output, with ' t p I t =P t its real price. The real wage w t is an aggregate of individual wages determined as described below. The last two terms re ‡ect hiring and …ring costs.
First-order conditions with respect to v t , l t , and z F t are, respectively:
as assumed below. See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). 1 6 As common in the literature, the i:i:d: assumption is for analytical tractability. A more realistic assumption would be to allow idiosyncratic shocks to display persistence. Results in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) lead us to conjecture that this would not a¤ect our results signi…cantly.
where t is the Lagrange multipliers attached to (7) and represents the current period (average) value of an extra worker for the producer, and w F t is the real wage of the marginal worker. Equation (8) states that at an optimum, the cost of posting a successfully …lled vacancy must be equal to its expected discounted value to the …rm, net of the …ring cost that may be incurred next period. Equation (9) states that the value of an extra worker must equate its (average) net cost plus the expected continuation value of the match. Equation (10) states that the marginal revenue product of the threshold worker must be equal to its wage cost net of the costs the …rm has to bear to …re the worker and post the vacancy to seek a replacement.
Wage Determination
The wage schedule is obtained through the solution of an individual Nash bargaining problem.
Without loss of generality, we consider a worker with idiosyncratic productivity z. The bargaining solution splits the surplus of the match between the worker and the …rm in shares determined by an exogenous bargaining weight between 0 and 1 according to the sharing rule:
where J t (z) is the …rm's surplus from employing worker z, W val t (z) represents the worker's asset value of being employed, and U val t is the value of unemployment. 17 Speci…cally:
F: 1 7 This bargaining weight captures the bargaining power of …rms and individual workers. We will introduce real wage rigidity below by assuming gradual adjustment of real wages from their initial (pre-reform) levels to their Nashbargaining levels (which will di¤er from the initial steady-state levels insofar as reforms change the Nash-bargaining weight ).
Firm surplus is determined by the marginal revenue product of the employment relation minus its costs, plus its expected discounted continuation. The expression of J t+1 takes into account the endogenous variation of the productivity threshold for …ring in the next period.
The worker's is:
where w is the labor income tax rate, t M t =U t is the endogenous probability of …nding a job in period t, and
The worker's outside option (identical across workers) is given by b w u + b w, where b is a positive parameter. The …rst term is home production, while the second is a transfer from the government interpreted as unemployment bene…ts. Worker surplus equals the wage net of the outside option plus expected discounted future surplus, accounting for endogenous variation in the future …ring threshold.
Using equation (8) , equation (12) can be rewritten as:
The sharing rule implies
Equation (13) can then be written as
to get
Substituting (14) and (15) into the bargaining rule (11) yields the equation for the individual real wage:
The bargained wage is intuitively increasing in the marginal revenue product of labor, the tightness of the labor market, and the worker's outside option. It decreases
As shown in Hall (2005) , Krause and Lubik (2007) , and Shimer (2005) , real wage rigidity improves the performance of the search-and-matching model in terms of the dynamics of labor market variables. We introduce a simple form of real wage rigidity that well serves the purposes of this paper by borrowing from Hall (2005) . In particular, we assume that the individual real wage actually paid to worker z is a weighted average of the one obtained through the Nash bargaining process in period t and its constant steady-state level: w a;t (z) %w t (z) + (1 %)w(z), with % between 0 and 1. 18 The aggregate real wage w t is the average of actual individual wages, weighted according to the distribution of idiosyncratic worker productivity:
The labor market structure of the economy can be summarized by a job creation equation, a job destruction equation, and the expression for the aggregate wage provided by (17) . Combining (8) and (9) yields the job creation equation:
stating that the expected cost of posting a vacancy today, =q t , has to be equal to its expected marginal bene…t (determined by the probability of match survival, its marginal revenue product net of wage cost, and vacancy cost saving next period). The job destruction condition (10) can be rewritten as:
This equation determines the cuto¤ productivity for …ring, z F t , a su¢ cient statistic for the behavior of job destruction. At the margin, the producer has to be indi¤erent between maintaining the match and …ring the threshold worker.
Household Budget Constraint and Intertemporal Decisions
International …nancial markets are assumed to be incomplete. The representative household in the small open economy can invest in three types of assets: domestic and foreign bonds, and shares in a mutual fund of wholesale …rms. 19 . Let x t be the share in the mutual fund of wholesale …rms held by the representative household entering period t. The representative household buys x t+1 shares in a mutual fund of all the …rms existing at time t-incumbents and new entrants, N t + N E;t -even though only a fraction (1 ) of these …rms will be producing in t + 1. The household does not know which …rms will be hit by the exit shock at the end of the period. Therefore, i …nances continued operation of all incumbents, and the entry of new …rms, and factors the exit risk in the pricing of the equity as determined below. The real price of one share at time t is equal to the price of claims to future real pro…ts e t . Let B t+1 denote nominal holdings of Home bonds (in home currency) and B ;t+1 nominal holdings of foreign bonds (in foreign currency) entering period t + 1.
As in Turnovsky (1985) and, more recently, Benigno (2009), we assume quadratic costs of adjusting international bond holdings to pin down their steady-state level and ensure stationary responses to temporary shocks. These adjustment costs are paid to intermediaries whose only function is to collect them and rebate them to the household in lump-sum fashion. (Home currency bonds are held only domestically, so no adjustment cost is needed to pin down their steady-state level.) The period budget constraint of the household can be written as:
where > 0, i t (i t ) is the home (foreign) nominal interest rate between t 1 and t, determined by the home (foreign) central bank at t 1; T f t is a lump-sum rebate of the international bond adjustment cost; and T t is a lump-sum tax or transfer from the government. Let b ;t+1 B ;t+1 =P t denote real holdings of foreign bonds. The Euler equations for domestic and foreign bonds are, respectively:
where CP I t (P t =P t 1 ) 1 and the foreign CPI in ‡ation rate is de…ned similarly, and the the Euler equations for share holdings is:
Note that forward iteration of this equation in the absence of speculative bubbles yields the expression for …rm value in the producer entry condition, providing the general equilibrium link between household and …rm behavior with respect to saving and investment decisions.
Symmetric Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the aggregate price index can be written as:
where:
Combining equations (20) and (21) yields:
Labor market equilibrium requires L t = l t and V t = v t . Hence, the law of motion of aggregate employment can be written as:
The government collects taxes on labor income and pays unemployment bene…ts. In equilibrium, any di¤erence between government revenue and expenses is …nanced by lump sum taxes T t :
The lump-sum rebate of international bond adjustment costs is such that:
Equilibrium in the markets for equity and the domestic bond requires x t+1 = x t = 1 and
Because of linearity of technology, intermediate market clearing requires:
Finally, equilibrium of international payments requires
where r t is the foreign real interest rate, de…ned by 1 + r t = (1
The left-hand side of this equation is home's current account (or the change in home's net foreign asset position).
This must be equal to the income balance (interest income on net foreign assets entering the period) plus the trade balance.
We de…ne the terms of trade as the price of imports relative to exports: T OT t Q t x;t = x;t .
Linearity of technology implies that we can de…ne home's GDP in units of consumption simple as:
To close the model, we need to specify processes for r t , N t , x;t , and y x;t , as well as the conduct of monetary policy for the small open economy. Since we focus only on domestic shocks, and the small open economy has a negligible impact on the rest of the world, we simply assume that foreign variables are constant and normalized to initial steady-state levels as standard practice in the literature.
Welfare-Consistent versus Data-Consistent Variables
A well established property of preferences or production functions that exhibit "love for variety"
is that aggregate output and prices increase if the number of available products expands even if individual good quantities and prices do not change. For instance, under our assumptions,
As the home economy experiences entry, the welfare-consistent aggregate price level P t ‡uctuates, even if individual product prices remain constant. As noted in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) , consumer price data do not correctly account for this variety e¤ect-not only because adjustments for variety do not happen at the frequency required for consistency with the model, but also because adjustments are not designed to match the preference speci…cation adopted in it. 20 As a result, central banks decide monetary policy by using price index (and quantity) data that do not account for variety in model-consistent manner.
To obtain model-based price and quantity variables that are close to available data, we follow Feenstra (1994) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and observe that a data-consistent price index can be constructed as e P t = . The correction t removes the pure variety e¤ect from the price index P t , leaving us with an index of average prices that is consistent with CPI data. Data-consistent CPI in ‡ation is then de…ned as~
Finally, given quantity X t in units of consumption (therefore, including the variety e¤ect), its data-consistent counterpart can be de…ned as X R;t P t X t = e P t .
Monetary Policy
The model is then closed by specifying the conduct of home's monetary policy. Under the benchmark scenario, we assume a ‡oating nominal exchange rate regime and an interest rate reaction function according to which the central banks responds to movements in data-consistent CPI in ‡a-tion and a data-consistent GDP gap relative to potential (de…ned as GDP in the equilibrium with ‡exible prices and wages):
As alternative scenario, we consider a currency union between the small open economy and the rest of the world. The union-wide monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate i t+1 without responding to in ‡ation and output dynamics of the small open economy, since the latter has a negligible impact on union-wide price indexes and macroeconomic aggregates.
The E¤ects of Product and Labor Market Reforms
In this section, we use a calibrated version of the model to study the consequences of alternative reforms of product and labor markets.
Calibration
We interpret periods as quarters and set several parameters at standard values in the literature.
Speci…cally, we set the discount factor at 0:99, implying an annual real interest rate of 4 percent.
The risk aversion coe¢ cient is equal to 2. The elasticity of substitution across domestic wholesale goods, , is set to 11 to imply a relatively low degree of monopoly power of the small economy's wholesale producers. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign bundles of products,
, is equal to 1:5. The degree of home bias, (1 ), is set to 0:8. The quadratic cost of adjusting prices is set to 80 as in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008) . This is a standard value for models that build on Rotemberg (1982) . The parameter governing habit persistence, h, is set to 0:75, and the scale parameter for the adjustment cost on foreign bonds is set to 0:004.
We base the calibration of product and labor market regulation and other characteristics of these markets mostly on Euro Area evidence before the recent crisis. Product market regulation is calibrated based on evidence in Pissarides (2003) , who compiles an index for producer entry delay as the number of business days that it takes (on average) to ful…ll entry requirements, weighted by the number of procedures that must be performed. Following the procedure proposed by Ebell and Haefke (2009), we convert the average of this index for Euro Area countries into months of lost output. We then set the regulatory component, f r , of …rm entry costs so that the costs required to ful…ll entry requirements amount to 0:81 quarters of lost output (based on 230 business days in a year). To pin down exogenous exit of …rms, , we target the portion of job destruction due to exit. Empirical evidence suggests that job destruction induced by plant exit ranges between 25 and 55 per cent in OECD countries. We choose a midpoint of those estimates and set that …rm exit accounts for 40 percent of overall job destruction. 21 Turning to the labor market, we set the elasticity of the matching function " to 0:6, a midpoint of estimates reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2003) . The parameter that determines the bargaining power of workers versus …rms, , is set to 0:6 to ensure that the Hosios condition " = is satis…ed in the initial steady state, and the parameter that governs real wage rigidity, %, is set we focus only on the implications of the model for market reforms, we assume that exogenous aggregate productivity Z t is constant and normalized to 1 in all periods. 22 Three labor market parameters are left to calibrate: the cost of vacancy posting, , the ‡ow value of home production h, and the e¢ ciency of the matching function, . As common practice in the literature, we chose the values of these parameters to match the steady-state unemployment rate, U , probability of …lling a vacancy, q, and total separation rate, . Total average separation, ,is 5 percent in Hobjin and Sahin's (2007) empirical evidence, and ECB (2002) and Weber (2000) estimate values of U and q at 9 percent and 0:7, respectively.
Finally, we need to calibrate the parameters of the monetary policy rule under ‡exible exchange rates. We compare the adjustment to reform under three di¤erent scenarios that illustrate the consequences of di¤erent approaches to policy In the benchmark case, % i = 0:8, % = 2, and % Y = 0:2. These parameter values fall within the standard ranges estimated from the behavior of many central banks since the 1990s. In the …rst alternative scenario, we increase the response of policy to in ‡ation to % = 9 to capture the consequences of a stronger concern for price stability.
In the second alternative scenario, we keep % at the benchmark level and increase the response of policy to the GDP gap to % Y = 0:8 to capture the e¤ects of stronger concern for output dynamics.
Structural Reforms and Their Calibration
We explore the e¤ects of structural reforms by studying the dynamic adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium following one-time, permanent change in product and labor market policy parameters.
We consider four types of market reforms, treating them as unanticipated: (i) a relaxation of employment protection, modeled as a simultaneous reduction in …ring costs and the bargaining power of individual workers 23 ; (ii) a cut in the unemployment bene…t replacement rate; (iii) a strength-ening of activation labor market policies (ALMPs), modeled in a stylized way as a simultaneous increase in the e¢ ciency of the job matching process and a reduction in the utility of being unemployed 24 ; (iv) a reduction in barriers to …rm entry. The size of the changes in unemployment bene…t, employment protection, and product market reform is pinned down by assuming that all relevant policy parameters are lowered from average levels prevailing across Euro Area countries (the values in the benchmark calibration above) to average levels prevailing across a group of (non-Euro Area) OECD countries where such parameters are estimated to characterize more ‡exible market conditions. Speci…cally, we assume that …ring costs and worker bargaining power are reduced by 25 percent, and the replacement rate is lowered to b = 0:58. Product market deregulation is a permanent decrease of regulatory barriers, f r , to 0:40 quarters of lost output. 25 For the ALMP reform, we consider a more arbitrary 25 percent change in the level of the parameters and w u , which are, respectively, increased and reduced. 26 Given the large size of the reform shocks, we solve the model using a Newton-type algorithm, …rst proposed by La¤argue (1990) . The details of the algorithm can be found in Juilliard (1996) .
We use the model to assess whether the dynamic e¤ect of a given reform changes depending on policy settings in other areas. Speci…cally, we simulate the dynamic impact of reforms to employment protection and unemployment bene…ts under di¤erent levels of barriers to entry, and vice versa. All dynamic simulation results are presented in Figures 1 to 6 , while the steady-state e¤ects are shown in Table 1 . We carried out sensitivity analysis which showed that results remain qualitatively unchanged under alternative values of key model parameters including the elasticity of substitution across domestic wholesale goods, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 2 4 This modeling choice can be justi…ed on the grounds that stronger activation policies can deliver positive labour market outcomes through at least two channels: improving the e¢ ciency of matching between workers and jobs, and increasing the motivation and ability of the unemployed to look e¤ectively for a job. Regarding the latter channel, so-called "threat e¤ects" from institutional mechanisms such as compulsory participation in active labor market programs or referral to ALMPs under threat of bene…t sanctions have been identi…ed in the literature (see Black et al., 2003 , Geerdsen and Holm, 2007 , and Kluve, 2010 . Such activation mechanisms are not unusual in OECD countries, for instance, Denmark and Sweden, but also Australia and the United Kingdom. The basic idea is that unemployed individuals may …nd that compulsory participation lowers their well-being, e.g., if participation in the programme entails scarring e¤ects or is seen as a tax on leisure. 2 5 Due to data limitations and diversity of sources, the composition of the country group used to determine the size of each reform is slightly di¤erent across policy parameters. In particular, the target for ‡exible product market regulation is constructed as an average of Australia, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The target for unemployment bene…ts and employment protection includes Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. To pin down the change in …ring costs and worker bargaining power that capture a reform of employment protection, we consider the ratio of OECD indexes of employment protection (excluding the component relative to temporary workers) for this group of countries and the Euro Area in 2008. In the data, this ratio is equal to 0:75. 2 6 While arbitrary, the assumed 25 percent change in these parameters does not drive the main results from the ALMP reform simulations, as these results are qualitatively robust to alternative choices for the size of the reform. foreign goods, bargaining power, or the variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. 27 The Dynamic Adjustment to Deregulation
Labor Market Reforms
Employment Protection Reform Figure 1 presents selected impulse responses to a weakening of employment protection under the alternative calibrations of the monetary policy rule mentioned above. 28 This reform reduces real wages by lowering individual workers' bargaining power, and it reduces the expected cost for …rms of terminating a job match (Figure 1 ). This boosts job creation. In the short run, however, the reduction in …ring costs also reduces the pro…tability of less-productive job matches, inducing …rms to layo¤ less productive workers. While the destruction of existing jobs is immediate, job creation is only gradual because it takes time to match …rms and unemployed workers-both newly unemployed ones and incumbent members of the unemployment pool. Therefore, the unemployment rate increases in the aftermath of the reform, before declining gradually as new jobs are created.
The initial decline in employment and real wages reduces aggregate demand, ceteris paribus.
However, households also anticipate a future increase in income, which leads them to reduce current saving. As a result of these two o¤setting forces, consumption remains roughly unchanged, before increasing gradually as employment and income rise. GDP falls slightly before rising above its pre-reform level already after a couple of quarters.
The relative price of home goods (i.e., the terms of trade) falls slightly due to a small decline in marginal costs, which in turn re ‡ects lower wages and …ring costs. 29 This terms-of-trade depreciation generates a negative wealth e¤ect due to the smaller revenue per exported good, but also expenditure switching toward home goods as these become cheaper than foreign ones, and a small improvement in the current account.
Despite the small decline in marginal costs associated with lower wages, there is a small initial pick-up in CPI in ‡ation in equilibrium, re ‡ecting mainly higher prices of imported goods. Over time, the bene…ts from employment protection reform strengthen. As jobs are created, unemployment declines, gets back to its pre-reform level-after less than a year-and ultimately falls further. This leads to higher GDP gains, which materialize fully roughly after two years. Real wages, however, remain permanently below their pre-reform levels (Table 1) .
Responses to this reform are very similar across calibrations of the monetary policy rule, and policy responds to the reform by increasing the interest rate: Under all calibration of the policy rule, higher in ‡ation ends up determining the direction of the policy response. Figure 2 presents the impulse responses to a reduction in the unemployment bene…t replacement rate. Responses are qualitatively comparable to the case of employment protection reform, but the e¤ects of lower unemployment bene…ts are more favorable in the short term. This is essentially because lower unemployment bene…ts boost job creation but do not increase job destruction, unlike lower …ring costs. This results in an immediate decline in unemployment-which also turns out to be ultimately more signi…cant for a plausible calibration of the reforms. 30 Consumption increases as a result of lower unemployment and higher income both in the short run and in the future. GDP also rises immediately. Despite the decline in marginal costs associated with lower wages, there is a small pick-up in CPI in ‡ation in equilibrium, re ‡ecting higher aggregate demand and higher prices of imported goods. The current account improves slightly as the decline in the relative price of home goods induces expenditure switching toward them and away from foreign goods. Again, the interest rate is increase. Over time, the gains from unemployment bene…t reform increase: Unemployment continues to decline and GDP rises further as jobs are created, with the full e¤ects being felt about two years after the reform. As with employment protection reform, real wages remain durably below their pre-reform levels, and there are very small di¤erences across calibrations of monetary policy. 31 Activation Policy Reform Figure 3 presents the responses to ALMP reform, which are qualitatively comparable to those of a bene…t replacement rate cut. Strengthening activation policies through enhanced matching e¢ ciency and lower utility value of unemployment boosts job creation in the short run without a¤ecting job destruction. As a result, there is an immediate and large decline in unemployment, which continues until about two years after the reform. Consumption and GDP increase as a result of lower unemployment and higher income both on impact and in the future. Wages decline and remain persistently below their pre-reform levels, putting downward pressure on the price of home goods. Nevertheless, higher aggregate demand and higher prices of imported goods push in ‡ation somewhat higher, and the current account strengthens slightly as a result of the decline in the relative price of home goods. Again, the interest rate rises and there are very small di¤erences across monetary policy calibrations. 32 Nevertheless, consumption falls less than it would in a closed economy as households borrow from abroad, resulting in a sizable weakening of the current account. This is consistent with results in Ghironi (2013, 2015) and injects some caution in naive readings of results in existing literature. For instance, Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2013) correctly point out the bene…t of easier business creation for long-run net foreign debt sustainability, but they do so in a static model. A dynamic model such as ours highlights that easier business creation can plausibly lead to a worsened current account at least for some time. 33 Firm entry boosts job creation, but the fall in consumption also induces incumbent …rms to downsize. As a result, job destruction dominates job creation, and unemployment rises for almost two years. Product market reform increases the marginal production costs of incumbents for two reasons: (i) Only the more productive workers keep their jobs as downsizing …rms immediately lay o¤ less productive workers, and because remaining workers are better paid-even when accounting for their higher productivity-, marginal labor costs rise; (ii) Current and expected …ring costs (which are a component of the marginal production cost) increase because of higher wages and the higher probability of laying o¤ existing workers. Higher production costs push the price of domestic goods higher, albeit less than proportionally due to price stickiness, resulting in temporarily lower markups. 34 The relative price of home goods (i.e., the terms of trade) rises. 35 Upward pressure on domestic goods prices induces the central bank to raise the interest rate, so that CPI in ‡ation changes only modestly in equilibrium-with some variation across di¤erent monetary policy calibrations, however. Higher domestic goods prices trigger substitution away from home goods toward foreign ones, further weakening the current account. Over time, as incumbent …rms stop laying o¤ workers and the unemployed …nd jobs in new …rms, unemployment declines and eventually falls below its pre-reform level, but this process is slow (see Table 1 for long-run e¤ects). Along this process, wages, consumption, and GDP increase. It takes loner to reach the new steady state after product market reform than after labor market reforms, however, though the long-term gains from product market reform are also larger.
Unemployment Bene…t Reform

Product Market Reform
Interactions across Market Policies and Reform Packages
The e¤ects of structural reform in one area depend in part on existing policy and institutional settings in other areas. Most importantly, the dynamics of the economy in the aftermath of product market reform are smoother if the labor market is " ‡exible"-as measured here by less stringent employment protection and lower unemployment bene…ts. 36 We illustrate this in Figure 5 . When entry barriers are lowered, new job vacancies are …lled more quickly and laid-o¤ workers …nd new jobs more rapidly in a ‡exible labor market. However, the long-run gains from product market reform are smaller if labor markets are ‡exible (Table 1) . This is because employment is higher to begin with, so that reducing barriers to …rm entry leads to a tighter labor market-i.e., to higher matching frictions-, lower pro…tability of …rm entry, and, ultimately, a smaller number of new …rms. Likewise, the long-run gains from reforms of employment protection, unemployment bene…ts, and activation are smaller if product markets are more ‡exible (Table 1) , although the stringency of product market regulation does not signi…cantly a¤ect the short-term e¤ects of these labor market 3 4 Increased input costs are not uncommon in the handful of DSGE model-based simulations of the dynamic e¤ects of product market reforms (see De Bandt and Vigna, 2008, or Everaert and Schule, 2008, for reforms in the tradable sector). In the model used here, and unlike in these papers, the in ‡ationary impact of higher input costs is not dominated by the de ‡ationary e¤ect of lower markups. This is partly because product market reforms are modeled as a decline in entry costs rather than an exogenous markup cut-indeed while markups vary during the transition, they remain unchanged in the steady state of our model. Alternative model speci…cations (not reported here) with translog preferences and endogenous ‡exible-price markups that decline with the number of …rms did not alter this …nding, i.e., the price of domestic goods still increases in the wake of a decline in …rm entry barriers. 3 5 As noted above, this contrasts with the implications of exogenous price markup cuts and suggests that the bene…ts of product market reforms do not accrue via improved competitiveness, at least for some time. 3 6 ALMP reforms are excluded from the simulations in this section because of the more arbitrary choice of policy parameter changes they entail. Results are qualitatively una¤ected by this exclusion. In particular, results are qualitatively similar if the de…nition of a ‡exible labor market also includes higher matching e¢ ciency and lower home production. reforms, because the latter do not have much impact on …rm dynamics (results available on request).
These results imply that there is long-run substitutability (rather than complementarity) between labor and product market reforms, i.e., a combination of both yields smaller gains than the sum of the e¤ects of each of them undertaken in isolation. 37 Although substitutability between product and labor market reforms mitigates the long-run gains from joint reforms of both markets, a broad reform package is still highly bene…cial. This is because it does not only deliver larger long-term gains than individual reforms (Table 1) , but also smooths short-term dynamics and speeds up the transition to the new steady state, as illustrated in Figure 6 . A combination of product market, employment protection, and unemployment bene…t reforms boosts GDP, employment, and wages immediately, in contrast with the e¤ects of some of these reforms in isolation. In particular, reducing entry barriers in product markets in parallel to labor market reforms reverses the wages losses that would result from the latter alone. Likewise, unemployment bene…t reform reverses the short-term rise in unemployment that would otherwise be associated with employment protection and product market reforms. More broadly, compared with individual reforms, a broad package yields a larger income gain, the expectation of which immediately boosts aggregate demand and job creation-although this e¤ect is not su¢ ciently large to prevent some small short-term decline in consumption associated with product market reform. 38 
The Role of Monetary Policy
Despite some transition costs in some cases, none of the reforms considered in the previous sections has de ‡ationary e¤ects that would call for interest rate cuts. Therefore, the model suggests that the ZLB constraint may not be an obstacle to the implementation of structural reforms in practice. 39 As noted above, di¤erences in the characteristics of monetary policy, conducted by means of simple, empirically relevant rules, do not appear to play a major role for the dynamic adjustment to labor market reforms (Figures 1-3 ). This is essentially because transition dynamics are largely driven by …rm and consumer expectations of the long-run e¤ects of reforms, which do not depend on the conduct of monetary policy as speci…ed in this paper. As a result, di¤erent monetary policy rules do not substantially alter marginal cost dynamics along the transition path, generating only small di¤erences for markups and domestic producer prices. 40 There are slight di¤erences across monetary policy scenarios, however. In particular, a rule that assigns greater weight to in ‡ation achieves somewhat quicker stabilization of price markups (for employment protection, unemployment, bene…t and activation policy reforms) at the cost of marginally more persistent unemployment (in the case of employment protection reform), compared with the benchmark calibration of policy.
These …ndings also hold, but are quantitatively stronger, in the case of product market reform, because this has larger e¤ects on marginal costs, price markups, and domestic producer prices ( Figure   4 and Figure 5 for similar …ndings when a broad package of product and labor market reforms is implemented). A central bank that responds more aggressively to in ‡ation dampens the decline in price markups at the cost of higher and more persistent unemployment. 41 Finally, short-run gains from labor market reforms are only marginally smaller if the reforming country belongs to a large monetary union than if it has a ‡exible exchange rate regime (results not reported). Labor market reforms slightly reduce marginal costs and domestic producer prices. As a result, the real interest rate tends to be somewhat higher than under a ‡exible exchange rate if, as in a large monetary union, the domestic central bank cannot respond to the shock imparted by the reform. Aggregate demand and the short-run gains in employment and GDP are then slightly smaller, and it takes a bit longer for the full bene…ts of labor market reforms to materialize. For product markets, by contrast, since a decline in barriers to …rm entry raises domestic producer costs and prices, a …xed exchange rate implies a lower real interest rate in the short run. This results in large immediate gains in GDP and employment.
Conclusions
This paper studied the consequences of product and labor market reforms in a New Keynesian, small open economy models with endogenous producer entry subject to sunk costs and labor market frictions. We showed that the bene…ts of reforms take time to materialize, and some reforms can 4 0 Cacciatore, Fiori, and Ghironi (2013) study optimal monetary policy following market deregulation in a monetary union of comparable-size countries. They show that the transition adjustment implied by the optimal policy di¤ers from the one implied by the type of simple policy rule studied here. The reason is that optimal policy implies an endogenous in ‡ation target that changes following market deregulation, unlike the simple rules of this paper, with consequences for the dynamic adjustment to reforms. 4 1 Cacciatore, Fiori, and Ghironi (2013) show that a policy of zero producer price in ‡ation is suboptimal in response to market reforms. In general, the optimal policy must strike a balance between minimizing price markup and unemployment ‡uctuations relative to their (e¢ cient) equilibrium levels. entail short-run transition costs. However, our results suggest that reforms do not impart signi…cant de ‡ationary pressure. Therefore, concerns about the zero lower bound on interest rates (or inability to use independent monetary policy in a monetary union) should not be viewed as stumbling blocks on the way to increased market ‡exibility. Decline in barriers to entry (in "flexible" labour markets) 6.4 -0.2 6.6 6.4
Relaxation of job protection (in "flexible" product markets) 0.2 -0. 
